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Abstract 
          The clamour for the adoption of ‘true fiscal federalism’ in Nigeria has 
been a burning issue in several quarters in the last three decades and has been 
documented in several articles, amongst which is the empirical study of 
Arowolo (2011:9). The United States of America (USA) which is the oldest 
federation in the world, and the United Kingdom – Nigeria’s erstwhile colonial 
master – were compared alongside Nigeria using qualitative comparative 
research method. This paper shows that these three countries have a lot of 
fascinating resemblance and conflicting ideals. For instance, although these 
three systems of fiscal federalism assign more powers to the central 
government, the manner in which the exercise these powers varies from one 
country to the other. Notably, while the Federal system of government in 
Nigeria exercises control over the natural resources of the devolved units, the 
devolved unit in the USA maintain control over their natural resources and 
remit returns to the centre; and in the UK mineral resources such as oil, gas, 
coal, gold and silver are controlled by the state while others are owned 
privately. The study, therefore, recommends amongst others that Nigeria 
should take a clue from the USA and UK system of resource control and fiscal 
federalism in order to foster national cohesion and promote sustainable growth 
and development among the federating units. 
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Introduction 
Fiscal federalism, also known as fiscal decentralization or devolution, 
means the allocation of government resources and spending to the various tiers 
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of government. It refers to the scope and structure of the tiers of governmental 
responsibilities and functions, and the allocation of resources among the tiers 
of government to carry out their various roles. Fiscal Federalism is, therefore, 
an offshoot of Federalism. Arowolo (2011) and Akindele and Olaopa, (2002) 
define Federalism as a political system in which state power is divided 
between the central or federal government, and regional governments (or 
provincial, state, territorial, cantonal, or other sub-unit governments) creating 
what is often called a federation. The study of Fiscal Federalism is very 
important as it evaluates which roles and instrument of government are best 
left in the domain of the central government, and which are best left in the 
hands of the sub-unit governments (Oates, 1999). According to Vincent 
(2001), the notion of federalism suggest that each level of government 
exercises its authority in an independent manner and should also have the right 
taxing ability to take advantage of  its independent sources of revenue. Fiscal 
federalism requires that each level of government should be self-sufficient and 
be able to perform its functions without running to the other levels of 
government for financial succour (Wheare, 1963). Fiscal federalism is a very 
essential ingredient for the sustainability of any federation as it promotes fiscal 
devolution of authorities to the sub-national governments and gives them 
financial independence to raise revenue and spend such accordingly. Fiscal 
devolution implies assigning decision-making power to the lower levels of 
government instead of concentrating it at the centre. This process gives each 
level of government the discretion to take decisions and assign resources in 
areas of their importance within their areas of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
federating units should be allowed to act freely on issues within their own 
jurisdiction (Ewetan, 2011). 
     Fiscal federalism defines the fiscal interaction between the central 
government and the other lower levels of government, and this interaction 
among the branches of government in the federation is explained in terms of 
three main theories which are:  
(a) The theory of fiscal relations: This theory explains the roles expected 
to be performed by each level of government in the fiscal allocation;  
(b) The theory of interjurisdictional collaboration which indicates areas of 
shared responsibility by the central, state and local governments and; 
(c)  The theory of multijurisdictional community (Tella, 1999): Here, each 
jurisdiction such as the state or local government will provide those 
services that are only beneficial to people within its domain, thus, 
should use only such sources of finance such as Internally Generated 
Revenue (IGR) which will internalize costs incurred in the process of 
providing such services. 
Having elaborated the theoretical background of fiscal federalism, efforts will 
be made to explore the manner in which fiscal federalism is practiced in 
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selected countries such as Nigeria, USA and UK. Before moving further, it is 
imperative to state that the key subjects which have to be dealt with and, 
possibly, resolved in any sound system of fiscal federalism are: equity and 
accountability; complexity versus transparency; should taxes be centralised or 
devolved?; Should taxes be competitive?; and the impact of fiscal federalism 
on economic growth. 
 
Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria 
    In Nigeria, the rise in the agitation for increased decentralization stems 
from the combination of people wanting to participate more in government, 
and the Federal government’s failure to provide quality services (Aigbokhan, 
1999; Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1995; Chete, 1998). Soon after her independence, 
the military rule, characterised by a centralised system of government, 
dominated the subsequent years of Nigeria’s political independence. This 
situation is the precursor of the present financial dominion enjoyed by the 
federal government over the thirty six states (36) states and federal capital 
territory, and seven hundred and seventy four (774) local governments’ areas 
of the federation after the country return to civilian rule in 1999. That is why, 
in some quarters, the present system of democracy in Nigeria is often referred 
to as a residue of the military rule. This has generated dissatisfaction in the 
Nigerian federation. Thus the concern over the advancement of a practical 
fiscal federalism for Nigeria is well in place. 
     Although the agitation for true federalism in Nigeria is more 
pronounced in the last two decades ( i.e. at the dawn of the return to civilian 
rule in 1999 ) as documented by Arowolo (2011), it is pertinent to note that 
the origin of this campaign stems from the poor performance of the public 
sector since the first half of the 1980s. During this time Nigerians have 
contended with dwindling real incomes, high levels of unemployment and 
inflation, moribund education sector, decay in infrastructural facilities, 
insecurity challenges, distrust between the regions, abysmal national cohesion, 
just to mention a few. This abysmal performance of the public sector has 
averted the prospects for a sustainable national growth and development, 
which should be the basis of a practical fiscal federalism. The aforesaid socio-
economic malaises have catalysed to incessant struggle for change, and most 
recently the violence and tension in the Niger Delta Region of the country for 
resource control. Struggle for more devolved fiscal system by the lower levels 
of government have continued to be resisted by a leviathan1 federal 
government. Various commissions and committees have been set up in the 
past to address these issues. The recommendations of these committees will 
be briefly discussed below. 
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An Overview of the Recommendations of Various Fiscal Commissions in 
Nigeria 
→The duties of the early fiscal commissions was limited to allocating 
to the regional governments total “non-declared” revenue consisting of import 
and export duties and excise and company taxes which, under the Constitution, 
was determined by the central government.  
→Phillipson Commission of 1946 recommended the use of derivation 
and even development as measure for distribution of revenue. Allocation of 
revenue followed this ratio: North, 46 per cent; west, 30 per cent and East, 24 
per cent. 
→The Hick-Phillipson Commission (1950) recommended need, 
derivation, independent revenue or fiscal autonomy and national interest as the 
measure for revenue allocation. 
 →Chicks Commission (1954) recommended derivation.  
 →Raisman Commission (1957) recommended a Distributable Pool 
Account (DPA) shared among the regions as follows: North, 40%; East, 31%; 
West, 24% and Southern Cameroun, 5%. When Southern Cameroun left the 
federation in 1961, the DPA was redistributed as follows: North, 42%; East, 
33% and West, 25%. When the Mid-West region was created in 1963, the 
share due to the then Western Region was shared between it and the new 
region in the ratio of 3:1 (Ewetan, 2011, p. 98-99; Arowolo, 2011, p. 10). 
→The Binns Commision (1964) advanced the principle of regional 
financial responsibility as against need and derivation. The revenue sharing 
formula was 42% to the north, 30% to the east, 20% to the west, and 8% to the 
mid-west. 
→Decree No. 15 of 1967 was promulgated to share the revenue in the 
Distributable Pool Account (DPA) among the 12 newly created states in 1967 
as follows: East Central, 17.5 %; Lagos, 2%; Mid-West, 8 %; the six Northern 
states, 7%; South Eastern region, 7.5 %; Rivers, 5 %; West, 18 %. The decree 
jettisoned all the basis of the previous revenue sharing formulae among the 
regions which include population, derivation and consumption among others 
(Ewetan 2011, p. 99). 
→The Dina Commission (1969) recommended national minimum 
standards, balanced development in the allocation of the states’ joint account 
and basic need (Arowolo 2011, p. 10). 
→Other decrees that followed between 1970 and 1975 were designed 
to correct the irregularity of Decree No. 15 of 1967, by reallocating revenue 
to states on a more equitable basis (Ewetan 2011, p. 99).  
→Aboyade Technical Committee (1977) recommended a national 
minimum standard for national integration: absorptive capacity, 21%; fiscal 
efficiency, 15%; equality of access to development opportunities, 25% and 
independent revenue effort, 18%. Other criterion are 57% to Federal 
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Government; 30% to State Governments; 10% to Local Governments; and 3% 
to a special fund (Arowolo 2011, p. 10 ). 
→Okigbo Commission (1979) recommended percentages on 
principles: population, 40%; equality, 40%; social development, 15%; and 
internal revenue effort, 5%. Percentages for government: Federal, 53%; States, 
30%; Local Governments, 10%; and Special Fund, 7%. (Ewetan 2011, p. 101; 
Arowolo 2011, p. 10). 
→The 1984 Allocation of Revenue Act further modified the sharing 
formula as follows: federal, 50 %; states,  30%; local governments, 15% and 
“others”, that is, oil producing areas and ecological fund, 5% (Ewetan 2011, 
p. 102). 
→Danjuma Commission (1988) recommended the following sharing 
formula for government: Federal (50%), States (30%), Local Government 
(15%), and Special Fund (5%) (Arowolo 2011, p. 10). 
→Under the current sharing formula: Federal, 52.68%; the 36 states 
take 26.72%, while the 774 local governments in the country take 20.60%. 
Over time, this formula has generated controversies and remains a key factor 
in the clamour for true federalism and resource control. The provision in the 
1999 constitution which vested the control of oil and natural gas in the 
government of the Federation, and not the state government or the individual, 
is also a contributory factor to the agitation for true federalism and resource 
control in Nigeria. 
     Also, experience has proved that revenue allocation portends the most 
difficult problem in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. A generally accepted formula 
has never been formulated, rather what has been presented overtime are 
measures of revenue allocation which are not based on rational consideration, 
but some primitive consideration. As a result of this, the revenue allocation 
formulae only impaired the ability of the states to generate revenue, as states 
solely depend on the monthly allocation from the federation account. The 
consequence of this revenue allocation dependence is that it limits the ability 
of states and local governments to provide public goods needed to sustain good 
governance. The problem is that, under the current formula, the federal 
government takes the largest share of the accumulated revenue, thereby 
leaving state and local governments with small shares which do not match the 
designated functions they are meant to carry-out ( Ewetan O. O. 2012). 
 
Fiscal Federalism in the United States of America. 
The Evolution of Fiscal Federalism in the United States of America 
Following the failure of its Confederal form of government in 1781, 
the United States of America (USA) adopted the federal form of government 
in 1789 thereby becoming the first modern federation in the world. Initially, 
the federation comprises of 13 states, but through its expansionism policy over 
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the years, the federation has evolved into a federation of 50 states, a federal 
district (Washington DC, the capital city of the United States), 5 major 
territories, various minor Islands, over 130 Native American domestic 
dependent nations, and numerous municipal governments. Despite the 
experience of series of political upheavals and a civil war in its first century 
of existence, The United States of America still upholds the tenets of the 1789 
federal constitution which make the federation the oldest in the world (“United 
States of America”, n.d.).  Thus any comparative study of fiscal federalism 
will use United States’ experience as a baseline.  
     The 1789 federal constitution of the USA was adopted with the 
following goals: First, it aims to correct the anomalies in the Articles of 
Confederation, thus, giving the federal government more capacity to 
coordinate the activities of the state government. The new federal structure 
instituted by the 1789 constitution was saddled with more powers which 
include the administering of international and interstate trade and to avert the 
states from competing and coming into conflicts in these areas. Second, the 
constitution aims to limit the powers of the new federal government through a 
set of checks and balances (“United States of America”, n.d.) Thus, in 
comparative terms, the United States is moderately non-centralized. Each state 
has its own constitution grounded in republican principles and also possesses 
some rights and powers under the United States constitution which serves as 
the supreme law of the Federation. The rights and powers of the states include: 
running elections ( states regulate most aspects of elections in the USA, 
including primaries, the eligibility of voters, running of state electoral college 
etc); creating local governments; ratifying constitutional amendments; 
administering the greater part of the criminal law and Justice; jurisdiction over 
civil law; power to levy taxes and other fees; controlling most domestic 
functions other than those associated with the regulation of the economy, 
including education, health, environmental protection and social services and 
controlling intrastate commerce. Each state and their residents have 
representatives in the federal congress consisting of the Senate and House of 
Representative (Two senators from each state for six years term and House of 
Representatives nominated according to population). There is a clear 
separation of power between the executive, legislative and judicial arm of 
government that exist in the federal and state government level (“Federal 
Government of the United States”, n.d.). 
     The endorsement of the 16th and 17th amendments in 1913 removed 
some limitations on the powers of the Federal government. These amendments 
gave the federal government unrestricted taxing powers and stipulated that 
congressmen were to be elected in a general election by popular votes instead 
of selected by state legislatures.  The federal government’s powers and rights 
include levying taxes, provided it does not discriminate among states; the 
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power to control foreign and interstate commerce; the absolute power to 
discuss the USA treaties and conduct foreign relations; administering national 
defence and the control of the armed forces; and the prerogative to handle 
crimes against the United States (Constitutional Amendments: The Bill of 
Rights 2018). It is noteworthy that the United States’ Constitution makes no 
reference to local governments. Local governments’ administration is a 
subject of the various state constitutions. Thus, the nature of the relationship 
between state and local governments, and among local governments, varies 
from one state to another. 
     Over these years, the powers of Washington over public and private 
life have been on the rise. Washington has exerted regulations bordering on 
clean air and water, access for the disabled and several other social goals. They 
have also come up with several unfunded federal mandates2 on states and local 
governments which tend to be burdensome on these units. The National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) recognized 192 unfunded mandates 
on the states which include: Medicaid, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, regulations governing the use 
of underground storage tanks, the Safe Drinking Water Act, requirements to 
remove asbestos and lead paints from schools and other areas, the Endangered 
Species Act, the Americans Living with Disabilities Act and the Fair Labour 
Standards Act. The U.S.A Conference of Mayors and Price Waterhouse 
appraise the cost of these mandates between 1994 and 1998 (with exception 
of Medicaid) on 314 cities at $54 billion, or the equivalent of 11.7% of all 
local taxes (Robert S. Stein, 1994). 
  
Revenue and Expenditure Allocation and Provisions Related to 
Intergovernmental Transfers in the USA 
      Revenue and Expenditure Allocation. The Constitution of the USA 
invests enormous discretionary power on the federal government to raise 
revenue. However, collecting tax revenue is not the exclusive right of the 
federal government as states also have right to raise revenue through taxes and 
control the local government taxing rights. Both levels of government can 
exploit the major revenue sources such as personal income tax, company tax 
and selective sales taxes. The U.S.A has a decentralised tax administration 
system, with each order of government having its own administrative system 
to collect the taxes it imposes (Watts, 1999). 
For natural resources control in the context of fiscal federalism in the USA, 
data from the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Information and Data 
Management of the U.S Department of Interior shows that oil and natural gas 
are owned by the state and private individuals who remit taxes to the federal 
government. 
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     In terms of expenditure allocation, there is no difference between the 
law-making and spending powers of the federal and state governments. The 
two levels of government have a close connection in the areas of spending that 
falls under the concurrent prerogative. More so part of the state and local 
spending is from the federal government. In spite of the inclination for state 
expenditure responsibilities to grow over time, the federal government still 
commands a dominant role in public spending in the United States. While most 
of state and local expenditure responsibilities are in areas of high growth such 
as education and health care, the federal government spends heavily in many 
high growth areas either concurrently with the states (e.g. health care) or 
exclusively in the areas of social security programs and national defence 
(Ronald and Marianne 2000). 
 
Intergovernmental Transfers in the USA 
The USA constitution does not recognize intergovernmental transfers.  
Therefore, arrangements that provides for vertical transfers or equalization 
plans are rarely available. In the same vein, the constitution does not stipulate 
percentage of federal taxes that should go to state governments. However, only 
a few federal taxes such as airport and fuel tax have been dedicated to state 
and local government to finance the transportation system (USA Constitution, 
Bill of Rights and all Amendments).  
This does not mean to say that intergovernmental transfer does not 
exist in the USA as nowhere in the constitution of the USA was it prohibited. 
Over the years, due to the greater revenue-raising and spending power of the 
federal government, states and local governments have relied heavily on 
transfers from the Federal government to carryout there financial obligations. 
Federal transfers have been used to cover a broad aspect of government 
functions such as health, social services, education, environmental protection, 
transportation and regional development. A considerable fraction of federal 
grants are passed on from state governments to local governments. Moreover, 
state governments make available some of their own-sourced grants to local 
governments. These transfers come in the form of conditional grants which 
stipulates what the grant is meant to achieve such as the nationally defined 
policies of the federal government, or to help the states in the area of 
redistributive policies among others (Ronald and Marianne 2000). 
   According to Ronald (1999), two variants of conditional transfers 
exist: the block transfers which have less restriction on how these funds will 
be used by the state governments or local government and the categorical 
transfers that make available financial assistance for some specific programs 
and its fund utilization is restricted to programs assigned.  Formula-based 
categorical transfers distribute wealth to state and local governments based on 
legislative or administrative standard set by the federal government. Formula 
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transfers consist of open-ended grants with matching requirements, and 
closed-ended matching and non-matching grants. Project grant, another 
variant of categorical transfer, is given discriminatory to states and local 
governments on the basis of application. 
     There has been a serious worry in the U.S.A writings on fiscal 
federalism in the context of the principle of financial responsibility. Political 
accountability demands that the level of government that raises the revenue 
should be the level of government that determines how it should be spent. In 
a parliamentary system, accountability for funds transferred from one level of 
government to the other is promoted as the executive that receives the funds 
is directly responsible to a legislature and by extension to an electorate. This 
is not the case in the USA system as the executive arm of government does 
not have such direct accountability to the legislature and electorate. Thus, the 
conditional transfer is used to recompense for this lack of accountability at the 
state level. Since it is the federal government that raises the funds being 
transferred, it demands that states should be accountable for those funds by 
stipulating the conditions on how the state or local government should spend 
them. Thus, presently almost all federal grants to state and local governments 
are conditional in nature. This kind of arrangement weakens state autonomy 
as states do not have the discretion to spend these funds on their priority areas 
other than that stipulated by the federal government. One of the advantages of 
using conditional grants is the inherent higher level of transparency than is 
found in some other federations (Ronald and Marianne 2000). 
 
Fiscal Federalism in the United Kingdom 
Introduction 
     The United Kingdom (UK), which comprises of England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, is a parliamentary democracy with a king or a 
queen as the head of state and a prime minister elected every five years 
duration as the head of government. The people also vote in their members of 
parliaments (MPs) to represent them. The prime minister chooses his ministers 
who form the Cabinet. The UK practices a unitary system of government 
where power is concentrated at the centre; although some powers have been 
recently devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to make certain 
government policies. 
After the referendums in Scotland and Wales in 1997, and in both parts 
of Ireland in 1998, the UK parliament transferred some powers and authorities 
to the national assemblies. This situation gave birth to the Scottish Parliament, 
National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999. 
The Scottish Government, (previously known as the Scottish Executive) is the 
devolved government of Scotland. The Scottish Government, which is 
answerable to the Scottish Parliament, develops and executes policies in the 
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areas of health, justice, education, transport and rural affairs. The National 
Assembly for Wales is the representative organ which passes legislation on 
devolved matters. The Welsh Assembly Government, which is answerable to 
the National Assembly for Wales, develops and implements policies in areas 
such as health, education, culture, environmental issues, economic 
development and transport. The Northern Ireland Executive is the devolved 
government of Northern Ireland. It legislates on areas of agriculture and rural 
development, public safety, social services, arts, culture, health and social and 
economic matters. The Northern Ireland Assembly, on the other hand, debates 
and makes laws, and inspects and reaches decision on the Northern Ireland 
government departments. They also deliberate on proposals for new laws 
presented to it by the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (“National 
Archive of the UK Government”, 2012). 
 
An Overview of Fiscal Federalism in the UK 
     Fiscal federalism in the UK is primarily concerned with the allocation 
of powers and obligations between the UK government and the devolved 
national governments of Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. According to 
Ben Lockwood (2013), the system of governance in the UK is one of the most 
centralized systems of government in the developed world. Thus local 
governments have a very limited power in the areas of tax management and 
expenditure administration which inhibit their policy direction. Local 
governments have only one local tax which is the residential property tax, also 
known as the council tax, which they have jurisdiction over the setting of the 
rate. Local business rates were eradicated in 1990 and an even business rate 
was introduced. The revenues generated from this even business rates are 
reallocated to local governments as part of the formula-based grant. Thus, 
suffice to say that local authority taxes ( i.e. council taxes and business rates) 
are devolved in the UK . This system of operations in the UK is quite different 
from that obtainable in many other countries, where regional governments 
have a lot of diverse major taxes under their jurisdiction. 
Ben Lockwood (2013) further asserts that local governments depend 
heavily on grants from central government. In 2011 these together constituted 
70.5% of council revenues. This makes UK local government one of the most 
reliant on central government grants among the countries in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). More so, a central 
government power to limit local government spending which is known as 
‘rate-capping’, have been on the statute books since the Rates Act 1984, and 
was also adopted in the 1992 Local Government Finance Act. The Localism 
Act of 2011 replaced the rate capping regime with a proposition for increases 
in local government taxation on the condition that a referendum will be 
conducted if the increase is perceived as being too much 
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     In the aspect of resource control under the UK context, the UK Centre 
for Sustainable Mineral Development documents that ownership and control 
of oil, gas, coal, gold and silver in the UK is exclusively vested in the state. 
Apart from the aforementioned minerals, the state does not own mineral rights 
in the UK. In general, there is private ownership of mineral resources in the 
UK and any information on mineral rights can be obtained from the Land 
Registry, together with details of land surface ownership. 
        Michael (2015) contends that the UK government takes responsibility 
for all national policies that have not been devolved to the national 
government, and these responsibilities include: defence, social security, 
foreign affairs, trade and macro-economic management. The UK government 
also takes responsibilities for government policy in England. Moreover, the 
UK parliament can make legislations for any part of the UK with the 
agreement of the devolved government on areas of devolved matters. 
 
Public Expenditure Framework in the United Kingdom 
Over the years, a public expenditure method known as the Barnett 
Formula (named after Joel Barnett who initiated it in 1978, while chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, as a temporary remedy to little cabinet 
disagreements in the build-up to planned political devolution in 1979) has 
been used by the UK treasury to automatically adjust the amounts of public 
expenditure allocated to Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland to reflect 
changes in expenditure allocated to public services in England, England and 
Wales or Great Britain, as the case may be. The formula only pertains to 
expenditure on matters for which the devolved administrations are 
responsible. The basic principle of this formula is that any rise or fall in 
expenditure in England will automatically lead to an equivalent rise or fall in 
expenditure allocated to the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This formula does not apply to all expenditures, but is the 
most likely option if no other decision is reached. The expenditure is allocated 
as a whole thereby availing each devolved administration the opportunity to 
allocate these funds as it deems fit. In aspects where the central government 
department funding covers England only, such as in the areas of health and 
education, the corresponding funding to the devolved governments comprise 
a baseline plus increases based on the increases in public spending in England 
in similar programmes, applied in comparison  to existing population. This 
Formula has no legal backing or democratic validation as it is just an ordinary 
convention that can be indiscriminately changed by the treasury. In 2009, the 
House of Lords Selected Committee on the Barnett Formula jettisoned the 
formula and recommended the introduction of a new system which allocates 
resources to the devolved units on the basis of their relative needs. In the event 
of the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, the Barnett 
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formula received extensive attention amid concerns that in a last-minute 
government effort to lure voters to vote against Scottish independence, 
pledged to allocate more public spending to Scotland (“Barnett Formula”, n.d., 
para. 1-4).  
    A number of the conflicts and apprehension witnessed on both sides of the 
English and Scottish frontier stems from the move towards significant fiscal 
federalism in one part of the UK. Some political pundits and public sector 
analysts in the UK hold the view that if the Labour government in UK had 
adopted federal structure for the UK as a whole prior to 2010, the momentum 
of the call for Scottish independence would not have taken an overwhelming 
dimension. 
 
Summary, Conclusion, Recommendations and Lessons for Nigeria 
     So far, this study explored fiscal federalism in Nigeria, USA and the 
UK – bringing insights into some of the highpoints in fiscal federalism as 
practiced by these various nations. In comparative terms, these three countries 
have a lot of interesting similarities and divergent ideals. For instance, the 
three systems of fiscal federalism assigns more powers to the central 
government, although the manner in which the exercise these powers varies 
from one country to the other. While the United States is moderately non-
centralized, the system of governance in the UK is one of the most centralized 
systems of government in the developed world. Nigeria’s fiscal system, on the 
other hand, is moderately centralised with the leviathan federal government 
having an overwhelming control over the economy. 
    In the USA, each state owns a constitution and also draws some rights and 
powers under the United States constitution which serves as the supreme law 
of the Federation. Among the rights and powers of the states are running most 
aspects of elections in the USA, including primaries, the eligibility of voters, 
running of state electoral college; creating local governments; ratifying 
constitutional amendments; administering the greater part of the criminal law 
and Justice; jurisdiction over civil law; power to levy taxes and other fees; 
controlling most domestic functions other than those associated with the 
regulation of the economy, including education, health, environmental 
protection and social services; and controlling intrastate commerce. This is not 
the case in Nigeria were the federal government have an overwhelming control 
over state activities and resources. In fiscal terms, majority of federally raised 
revenue flow into the Federations Account which is in turn share according to 
a predetermined percentage. The federal government takes the greatest share 
from this accumulated revenue in the Federation Account, thus leaving state 
and local governments with small shares which are not enough to carry out 
their designated function. In the UK, on the other hand, a public expenditure 
mechanism known as the Barnett Formula has been used by the UK treasury 
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to automatically adjust the amounts of public expenditure allocated to 
Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland to reflect changes in expenditure 
allocated to public services in England, England and Wales or Great Britain, 
as the case may be. The formula only pertains to expenditure on matters for 
which the devolved administrations are responsible. The basic principle of this 
formula is that any rise or fall in expenditure in England will automatically 
lead to an equivalent rise or fall in expenditure allocated to the devolved 
governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This system of revenue 
allocation tends to be fairly equitable than the revenue allocation formulae in 
Nigeria which are not based on rational consideration, but some primitive 
consideration.  
     Under the United States’ fiscal federalism, Local governments’ 
administration is a subject of the various state constitutions. The Federal 
constitution makes no mention of local government. Thus, the nature of the 
relationship between state and local governments, and among local 
governments, varies from one state to another. One major advantage of this 
setting is that it makes government very closer to the people in its true sense. 
In Nigeria, local governments are recognized by the federal constitution as the 
third tier of government. The bulk of their revenue comes from the statutory 
allocation from the federal government. This practice is similar to that 
obtainable in the UK were local governments depend heavily on grants from 
central government to run their day-to-day activity.  Local governments in the 
UK have a very limited power in the areas of tax management and expenditure 
administration which inhibit their policy direction. This contrasts with Nigeria 
and USA where local governments have considerable taxes under their 
jurisdiction. 
    Furthermore, some forms of conditional transfer exist in Nigeria. A 
typical example is the Universal Basic Education (UBEC), where the federal 
government makes 2% of its statutory allocation to states. The USA fiscal 
system does not recognize intergovernmental transfers. In the same vein, it 
does not stipulate percentage of federal taxes that should go to state 
governments. That does not mean to say that intergovernmental transfers do 
not exist in the USA as nowhere in the constitution was it banned. As a matter 
of fact, due to the greater  revenue-raising and spending power of the US 
federal government, states and local governments rely greatly on transfers 
from the Federal government to carryout there financial obligations. A 
considerable fraction of federal grants are passed on from state governments 
to local governments as conditional grants which stipulate what the grants 
should be used for. This kind of arrangement weakens state autonomy as states 
do not have the discretion to spend these funds on their priority areas other 
than that stipulated by the federal government. This contrast with Nigeria and 
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UK where the regional governments have the discretion to spend the grants 
from the centre how it deems fit. 
     In Nigeria, the legal right to own and control natural resources, 
including oil and gas, resides with the federal government, whereas in the USA 
onshore resources ownership normally resides with the states. In the UK, apart 
from oil, gas, coal, silver and gold which are owned by the central government, 
all other mineral resources are privately owned. This case of the control of 
natural resources being vested in the hands of the federal government of 
Nigeria is the precursor of the agitation for resource control in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. It is the considered opinion of this study that states should 
control their natural resources and use same to develop their regions while the 
remit returns to the Federal government. This study does not consider it 
appropriate a situation where resources emanating from one state or region are 
used to develop another state or region at the detriment of the state that owns 
the resources. This scenario tends to make some states unproductive and, thus, 
make them rely on others states for succour and means of their survival. In 
Nigeria, states run to Abuja monthly to grab their share of the national wealth 
even when some of these states contribute little or nothing to the national 
wealth. One notable, as well as worrisome, case at hand is where tax revenues 
raised from sales of alcohol from liberal states that permit the sale and intake 
of alcohol is shared among all states – together with some states that prohibit 
the sale and intake of alcohol due to religious ideology.  
        Thus, this study is of the opinion that resource control will encourage 
every state to improve on their mineral deposits, revenue raising abilities and 
productive capacity. This study draws its argument from the USA and UK 
system of natural resource control where state and private ownership of natural 
resources exist and returns remitted to the central government. This system 
encourages healthy competition for exploration and development of natural 
resources among states and regions in the federation which in turn culminate 
to even and sustainable economic growth and development. Therefore, it is 
suggestive that Nigeria should take a clue from the USA and UK system of 
resource control to foster national cohesion and promote sustainable growth 
and development.  
 
Endnotes 
1 Leviathan model was first developed by Geoffrey Brennan and James 
Buchanan in their book, “The Power of Tax” published in 1980. In this model, 
government is presumed to act as a monopolist that maximises tax revenue. 
The theorised that government tries to get control of as much of the economy 
as possible. 
2 Federal mandates are requirements set out by the Federal government 
through legislation, executive order, or judicial fiat which mandate state and 
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local governments to embark on a number of programs or provide some 
services at their own cost.  
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